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Abstract—The past decade has witnessed the rise of crowd-
sourcing, and privacy in crowdsourcing has also gained rising
concern in the meantime. In this paper, we focus on the
privacy leaks and sybil attacks during the task matching,
and propose a privacy-preserving task matching scheme, called
SybMatch. The SybMatch scheme can simultaneously protect
the privacy of publishers and subscribers against semi-honest
crowdsourcing service provider, and meanwhile support the
sybil detection against greedy subscribers and efficient user
revocation. Detailed security analysis and thorough perfor-
mance evaluation show that the SybMatch scheme is secure
and efficient.
Index Terms—Sybil detection, crowdsourcing, task matching,
privacy-preserving
1. Introduction
Crowdsourcing [1] as a distributed computing paradigm
has attracted a lot of attention over the past decade.
Many crowdsourcing platforms (e.g., Amazon Mechanical
MTurk1) have been established to provide all kinds of
crowdsourcing services, such as data sensing, image cate-
gorization. Wit utilization of crowdsourcing, task publishers
can outsource complex tasks to task subscribers through a
crowdsourcing service provider (CSP) as the broker.
To achieve the efficient and accurate task recommenda-
tion, the CSP needs to match task requirements specified by
task publishers with interests given by task subscribers [2]-
[4]. However, considering the CSP cannot be fully trusted
in the sense that it may obtain the sensitive information
about task requirements and interests, such matching solu-
tions over plaintexts will make publishers and subscribers
in danger [5]-[8]. Therefore, it is important to protect the
privacy of publishers and subscribers against the CSP during
the task matching.
Searchable encryption (SE) [10] is a potential technique
and it has been utilized to realize various matching function-
alities, such as ranked search [11], personalized search [12],
and blockchain based search [13]. However, most of SE
1. https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome
schemes only allow the single user holding the secret key to
query the encrypted data. Since there are multiple publishers
and multiple subscribers in crowdsourcing, query account-
ability cannot be achieved and user revocation will incur
the re-initialization of system if using single-user SE. Thus,
these single-user SE schemes cannot be directly applied to
the multi-user crowdsourcing environment. To make single-
user SE applicable to the multi-user environment, Dong et
al. [14] and Kiayias et al. [15] respectively utilized proxy
re-encryption and key derivation method to realize the multi-
user SE schemes where every user is allowed to search over
the encrypted data published by all data owners.
Inspired by those works, we utilized proxy re-encryption
to design two schemes [16], [17], which respectively
achieves the single-keyword and multi-keyword task match-
ing while protecting the privacy against the CSP. However,
in real crowdsourcing, since the subscribers are from various
backgrounds and their true identities are never being veri-
fied, they cannot be fully trusted either. In order to subscribe
more tasks from the CSP, a greedy worker may launch
the sybil attacks in the way that it frequently changes its
pseudonym and repeatedly submits its subscription to the
CSP. Therefore, efficient sybil detection should be consid-
ered in the designing of privacy-preserving task matching
for defending against the sybil attacks.
In this paper, we analyze the potential privacy leaks
and attacks during the task matching in crowdsourcing, and
propose a privacy-preserving task matching scheme with
sybil detection, called SybMatch. In SybMatch, we combine
PEKS [18] with ID-based signature [19] to simultaneously
protect the privacy against the CSP and achieve the sybil
detection against the greedy subscribers. Moreover, the Syb-
Match scheme supports the efficient revocation. Through
detailed security analysis, we prove that the SybMatch
scheme is IND-CKA secure and existential unforgeable.
Theoretical analysis and simulation evaluation demonstrate
that the SybMatch scheme is efficient and feasible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the models, design goals and some preliminaries.
The detailed construction and security analysis are described
in Section 3. Then we analyze the the performance in
Section 4 and finally conclude the paper in Section 5.
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Figure 1. System model
2. Problem Formulation
2.1. System Model
As shown in Figure 1, there are four entities in the
crowdsourcing system: a key generation centre (KGC), a
crowdsourcing service provider (CSP), multiple subscribers
and multiple publishers. Their roles are defined as follows:
The KGC is mainly responsible for system initialization
and user registration. It outputs a public key to all the
publishers for task publication, and assigns a distinct private
key to each registered subscriber for task subscription.
The subscribers are the users who subscribe tasks from
the CSP. In order to subscribe the tasks of its interests, a
subscriber specifies a subscription (e.g., keywords, expres-
sions) and encrypts it with its own private key. Then the
subscriber sends the encrypted subscription to the CSP.
The publishers are the users who publish tasks on the
CSP. When publishing a task, a publisher sets the task
requirement (e.g., keywords, expressions) and encrypts it
with the public key while encrypting the task content. Then
the publisher submits the requirement ciphertext to the CSP,
together with the encrypted task content.
The CSP is in charge of task matching. Upon receiving
a task publication, the CSP performs the matching process
between the requirement ciphertext and the subscriptions,
and pushes the task to the matched subscribers.
Note that the encryption and decryption of task content
are out of scope of this paper.
2.2. Threat Model
The KGC is fully trusted and the publishers are honest.
The authorized subscribers are considered as honest-but-
greedy in the sense that they may launch sybil attacks to
subscribe mores tasks from the CSP.
The CSP is considered as honest-but-curious in the sense
that it will honestly execute the designed protocol but may
be curious to know the sensitive information about the re-
ceived task requirements and subscriptions. We assume that
the CSP will not launch active attacks, such as collusion with
the authorized subscribers or publishers. This assumption is
reasonable, as a large and reputable CSP will not launch
these reputation-damaging attacks.
2.3. Design Goals
Multi-publisher and multi-subscriber. The proposed
scheme should support the task-subscriber matching be-
tween multiple publishers and multiple subscribers. Specif-
ically, a constant-size requirement ciphertext output by any
publisher can be tested with a constant-size encrypted sub-
scription generated by any authorized subscriber.
User scalability. The proposed scheme shall allow the
efficient user enrollment and user revocation in the dynamic
crowdsourcing.
Security. 1) Privacy-preserving. The proposed scheme
shall protect requirement privacy and subscription privacy
from the CSP; 2) Sybil detection. The proposed scheme shall
support the sybil detection that enables the CSP to defend
against sybil attacks launched by greedy workers;
2.4. Preliminaries
Bilinear Map. Let G and GT be two multiplicative cyclic
groups of a same prime order p with g as a generator of G. A
bilinear map e : G×G→ GT has the following properties:
• Bilinearity: ∀a, b ∈ Z∗p, e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab.
• Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) ̸= 1.
• Computability: e is efficiently computed.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption. The
CDH problem in G is stated as: given (g, ga, gb) ∈ G3
as input, where a, b ∈ Z∗p are randomly chosen, compute
gab ∈ G. The CDH assumption holds if the advantage to
solve the CDH problem is negligible for any PPT algorithm.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption. The BDH
problem in G is stated as: given (g, ga, gb, gc) ∈ G4 as input,
where a, b, c ∈ Z∗p are randomly chosen, output e(g, g)abc ∈
GT . The BDH assumption holds if the advantage to solve
the BDH problem is negligible for any PPT algorithm.
3. The SybMatch Scheme
For the sake of clarity, we consider the single keyword
matching in SybMatch. More complex matching function-
alities (e.g., range, boolean) can be easily achieved by
integrating other SE schemes. As illustrated in Figure 2,
the SybMatch system proceeds as follows:
• Initialization and Registration. The KGC initializes
the system and assigns keys for registered users.
• Subscription and Detection. Each subscriber gener-
ates the encrypted subscription and sends it to the
CSP which then performs the sybil detection for the
received subscription.
• Publication and Matching. A publisher encrypts
the task requirement and submits the requirement
ciphertext to the CSP which then conducts the
requirement-subscription matching process.
• Revocation. The KGC revokes the leaving sub-
scribers in cooperation with the CSP.
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Figure 2. Framework of SybMatch
3.1. Construction
Initialization and Registration. The KGC initializes the
system by calling the Setup algorithm, and outputs a public
key PK to all the entities involved in the system including
the CSP, publishers and subscribers. Then for each registered
subscriber ui, the KGC assigns it a distinct private key SKi
by executing the KeyGen algorithm.
Setup(1λ)→ (PK,MSK). It generates two multiplica-
tive cyclic groups G, GT of a same prime order p with a
bilinear mapping e : G×G→ GT . Let g be a generator of
G. Then it randomly selects α, x ∈ Z∗p and defines hash
functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G, H2 : GT → {0, 1}log p,
H3 : {0, 1}∗ × G → Z∗p, H4 : {0, 1}∗ → G (Note that
H1 and H4 are used for different purposes). The public key
is output as
PK = (G,GT , e, p, g, gα, gx,H1,H2,H3,H4)
and the master secret key is set as MSK = (α, x).
KeyGen(MSK,ui)→ SKi. Given a subscriber identity
ui, it outputs SKi = (ssk,Ki), where ssk = α and Ki =
H4(ui)
x, as a private key of the subscriber ui.
Subscription and Detection. To subscribe the tasks
matching with some keyword q, a subscriber ui generates
the subscription and signature (S, σ) of q by calling the
SubGen algorithm with its private key SKi, and sends (S, σ)
to the CSP together with the identity ui. Upon receiving
the subscription request from the subscriber ui, the CSP
performs the sybil attack detection to check whether the
subscriber ui has previously submitted the subscription.
As illustrated in Algorithm 1, the sybil attack detection
proceeds as follows:
1) It first verifies whether the request is indeed from
the claimed identity ui by calling the Verify algo-
rithm. If Verify(PK, ui, S, σ) = 0 which means the
request is not from the claimed identity ui, it drops
the subscription request.
Algorithm 1: Sybil attack detection
Input: Subscription Request (ui, S, σ), Public Key
PK, Revocation List RL, Index I
Output: Invalid Signature, Identity Revoked, Sybil
Detected or Sybil Undetected
if Verify(PK, ui, S, σ) = 0 then
Return “Invalid Signature”
else
if ui ∈ RL then
Return “Identity Revoked”
else
if ui ∈ I then
Return “Sybil Detected”
else
Add (ui, S) in I
Return “Sybil Undetected”
2) Otherwise, it then checks whether the subscriber
ui is revoked by checking the existence of ui in
the revocation list RL, which stores the identities
of revoked subscribers and is initially empty. If
the subscriber ui has been revoked, it drops the
subscription request.
3) Otherwise, it continues to check whether there is an
entry corresponding to ui stored in the subscription
index I . If no entry corresponding to ui in the
index, it stores the subscription S in the index.
Otherwise, it drops the subscription request.
SubGen(SKi, q) → (S, σ). Given a keyword q, it first
computes the subscription S = H1(q)α. Then it randomly
picks r ∈ Z∗p and outputs a signature σ = (U, V ) of S as:
U = gr, V = H4(ui)
r ·Khi ,
where h = H3(S,U).
Verify(PK, ui, S, σ) → 1/0. Given a signature σ =
(U, V ) of a subscription S for an identity ui, it computes
h = H3(S,U) and accepts the signature if (g,H4(ui), U ·
gx·h, V ) is valid Diffie-Hellman Tuple. That is, it checks if
e(H4(ui), U · gx·h) ?= e(g, V ).
If the equality holds, it outputs 1; otherwise, it outputs 0.
Theorem 1 (Signature Correctness). The signature process
is correct. That is, if σ is a signature of a subscription S
for an identity ui, we have Verify(PK, ui, S, σ) = 1.
Proof. Suppose σ = (U, V ) where
U = gr,
V = H4(ui)
r ·Khi = H4(ui)r+xh,
h = H3(S,U),
we have
e(H4(ui), U · gx·h) = e(H4(ui), gr+xh),
e(g, V ) = e(g,H4(ui)
r+xh).
Thus we have e(H4(ui), U · gx·h) = e(g, V ).
Remark. When receiving k subscription requests at the
same time, the CSP can conduct an efficient batch verifi-
cation as follows.
BatchVerify({(ui, Si, σi)}1≤i≤k) → 1/{i}. Given k
subscription requests (u1, S1, σ1), · · · , (uk, Sk, σk) where
σi = (Ui, Vi), it checks if
e(g,
k∏
i=0
Vi)
?
=
k∏
i=0
e(H4(ui), Ui · gx·hi),
where hi = H3(Si, Ui). If the quality holds, it outputs 1;
otherwise, it uses divide-and-conquer method to find the
index {i} of invalid signatures.
Publication and Matching. When publishing a task,
a publisher encrypts a requirement keyword w with the
ReqEnc algorithm and submits the ciphertext C to the CSP.
Upon receiving the request of task publication, the CSP
conducts the requirement-subscription matching process by
running Match with each subscription stored in the index I .
If Match(PK,C, S) = 1 for some subscription S, the CSP
pushes the task to the corresponding subscriber.
ReqEnc(PK,w)→ C. It randomly chooses t ∈ Z∗p, and
computes A = e(H1(w), (gα)t). It outputs C = (gt,H2(A))
as a ciphertext of keyword w.
Match(PK,C, S) → 1/0. Given a ciphertext C =
(C1, C2) and a subscription S, it checks if
H2(e(S,C1))
?
= C2.
If the equation holds, it outputs 1; otherwise, it outputs 0.
Theorem 2 (Matching Correctness). The task matching
process is correct. That is, if both C and S are constructed
based on a same keyword, we have Match(PK,C, S) = 1.
Proof. Given a ciphertext C = (C1, C2), where C1 = gt
and C2 = H2(e(H1(w), (gα)t)) and a subscription S =
H1(w)
α, we have
e(S,C1) = e(H1(w)
α, gt)
⇔ H2(e(S,C1)) = H2(e(H1(w), gα·t))
⇔ H2(e(S,C1)) = C2.
That completes the proof.
Revocation. When a subscriber ui leaves the system, the
KGC notifies the CSP to revoke ui’s subscription ability by
enabling the CSP to run the Revoke algorithm.
Revoke(ui). Given a subscriber identity ui, it revokes
the subscriber ui’s subscription ability by deleting the sub-
scription of ui in the index I , and at the same time adds the
identity ui into the revocation list RL, i.e., RL = RL∪ ui.
3.2. Security Analysis
According to the security goals we set in Section 2.3,
SybMatch should protect subscription privacy and require-
ment privacy, and meanwhile support the sybil detection.
As for subscription privacy, same as most of PEKS schemes
[18], we don’t consider offline keyword guessing attacks and
only ensure the one-wayness of subscription in SybMatch.
As for requirement privacy, we prove that the SybMatch
scheme is Computationally Indistinguishable Secure against
Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attacks (IND-CKA) through
Theorem 3. Informally speaking, the adversary cannot dis-
tinguish the ciphertexts of two arbitrary keywords unless the
corresponding subscriptions are available.
Theorem 3. The SybMatch scheme is IND-CKA secure in
the random oracle model under the BDH assumption. If a
PPT adversary A, making at most qH2 hash function queries
to H2 and at most qS subscription queries, breaks the IND-
CKA security game with advantage ε, we can construct
a PPT algorithm B, which breaks the BDH problem with
advantage at least ε′ = ε/(eqH2qS).
Proof. Given a BDH instance (g, ga, gb, gc) ∈ G4, B simu-
lates the IND-CKA game with A as follows:
Setup. B randomly chooses x ∈ Z∗p, and gives A the
public key PK = (g, ga, gx).
H1-query. B maintains a hash list called H1-list, which
stores the tuples < wi, ci, ai, bi > and is initially empty.
When A queries a keyword wi, B proceeds as follows:
1) If wi already exits in the H1-list, B responds with
the corresponding bi.
2) Otherwise, B picks a random coin ci ∈ {0, 1} such
that Pr[ci = 0] = 1/(qS+1), and randomly chooses
ai ∈ Z∗p. Then it computes bi as follows.
bi =
{
gb · gai , if ci = 0
gai , if ci = 1
After that, B responds with bi and adds the tuple
< wi, ci, ai, bi > to the H1-list.
H2-query When A queries H2(A), B responds with a
random element R ∈ GT and stores < A,R > in H2-list.
H3-query. When A issues a query of H3(Si, Ui), B
chooses a random value hi ∈ Z∗p and responds with hi.
H4-query.WhenA issues a query ofH4(ui), B Chooses
a random value xi ∈ Z∗p and responds with H4(ui) = gxi .
Subscription query. When A issues a subscription
query of a keyword wi for an identity ui, B invokes the
random oracle H1 with wi and then proceeds as follows:
1) If ci = 0, it declares failure and exits.
2) Otherwise, it reports bi = gai . Then B randomly
chooses ri ∈ Z∗p and responds A with Si = (ga)ai ,
σi = (Ui = g
ri−x·hi , Vi = gxi·ri). Note that Si
is the correct subscription of wi under the public
key (g, ga), and since (g,H4(ui), Ui · gx·hi , Vi) is
a valid DDH tuple, σi is a valid signature.
Challenge. A provides two keywords w0, w1 on which
it wishes to be challenged. B invokes the random ora-
cle H1 and obtains H1(w0) = b0, H1(w1) = b1. If
c0 = c1 = 1, B reports failure and exists. Otherwise, B
randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} such that cb = 0, and
responds with C = (gc, J) where J = H2(H1(wb), (ga)c) =
H2(e(g, g)
ac(b+ai)).
Output. A outputs its guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. B picks a ran-
dom pair (A,R) from the H2-list and outputs A/e(ga, gc)ab
as its guess for e(g, g)abc.
To calculate the success probability of B, we define the
following events:
• ξ1: B doesn’t abort during the subscription phase.
• ξ2: B doesn’t abort during the challenge phase.
During the subscription phase, if ci = 0, then B aborts.
Thus, we have Pr[ξ1] = (1− 1/(qS + 1))qS ≥ 1/e. During
the challenge phase, if c0 = c1 = 1, then B aborts. Thus, we
have Pr[ξ2] = 1− (1− 1/(qS + 1))2 ≥ 1/qS . Since ξ1 and
ξ2 are independent, we have Pr[ξ1 ∧ ξ2] = Pr[ξ1] · Pr[ξ2] ≥
1/(e · qS). Considering that B chooses the correct pair with
probability at least 1/qH2 , B’s success advantange is at least
ε/(eqH2qS).
As for sybil detection, we need to prove that the sub-
scription request (ui, S, σ) cannot be forged. Obviously, the
unforgeability of (ui, S, σ) depends on the unforgeability
of ID-based signature scheme [19]. According to Theorem
3 in [19], this ID-based signature scheme achieves the
existential unforgeability under adaptively chosen message
and ID attacks in the random oracle model under the CDH
assumption.
4. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Syb-
Match through theoretical analysis and simulation study,
in comparison with two state-of-the-art related schemes: a
proxy based multi-user SE scheme called MSDE [14] and
a proxy-free multi-user SE scheme called SEMEKS [15].
TABLE 1. COMPUTATION COMPLEXITY
Algorithm MSDE SEMEKS SybMatch
Setup neg 8E 2E
KeyGen neg 16E E + H4
SubGen 6E + fs 12E 4E +
∑
i=1,3,4 Hi
Verify - - E + 2P +
∑
i=3,4 Hi
ReqEnc 3E+ fs+H5 9E 2E + P +
∑
i=1,2 Hi
Match 2E + H5 5P P + H2
Revoke neg - neg
E: exponentiation on group G; P: pairing operation on group G.
Hash operations H1, H2, H3, H4, H5 : G → Z∗p; fs: key-based
hash operation {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p.
“neg”: negligible compared with the above operations.
TABLE 2. COMMUNICATION COST
MSDE SEMEKS SybMatch
Secret key |Z∗p|+|s| 12|G| |Z∗p|+|G|
Re-key 2 · |Z∗p| - -
Subscription |Z∗p|+2|G| 5|G| |G|
Signature - - |Z∗p|+2|G|
Ciphertext 2|Z∗p|+2|G| 5|G| |Z∗p|+|G|
|G|: element size in G; |Z∗p|: element size in Z∗p.
MSDE
SEMEKS
SybMatch
T
im
e 
co
st
 (
s)
0
100
200
300
400
500
Number of subscribers (×103)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 3. Subscriber registration
MSDE
SEMEKS
SybMatch
T
im
e 
co
st
 (
×
1
0
-3
s)
0
100
200
300
400
Number of keywords in subcription
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 4. Subscription generation
We first theoretically analyse the computation complex-
ity and communication cost for all the schemes, as shown
in TABLE 1, TABLE 2, respectively. We can see SybMatch
far outperforms SEMEKS in all aspects of computation
and communication costs, and outperforms MSDE in some
aspects, e.g., communication costs of subscription and ci-
phertext.
To evaluate the practical performance, we implement all
the schemes in python on a Ubuntu 12.04 virtual machine
with a single core at 3.20GHz and 1GB RAM, relying on
the PBC library [20] and the Charm framework [21]. In
the simulation, we choose a 160-bit prime p and a SS512
curve where the base field size is 512-bit and the embedding
degree is 2.
Figure 3 shows the time cost of subscriber registration
under different number of subscribers. It shows that Syb-
Match slightly underperforms MSDE but far outperforms
SEMEKS. Figure 4 indicates that the subscription genera-
tion of SybMatch will be more efficient than those in both
MSDE and SEMEKS when the number of keywords in
the subscription increases. Figure 5 shows that signature
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Figure 7. Match. (a) when the number of keyword ciphertexts is 1; (b)
when the number of keyword subscriptions is 1.
verification on the CSP is quite efficient. For example, it
only takes about 1.32s to conduct a batch verification for
100 signatures. Figure 6 shows that requirement encryption
in SybMatch is less efficient than that in MSDE, but more
efficient than that in SEMEKS. We also evaluate the per-
formance of matching under different number of keyword
subscriptions and keyword ciphertexts, as shown in Figure
7, and observe that the matching operation in SybMatch is
much more efficient than that in SEMEKS.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we formulated the problem of privacy-
preserving task matching for multi-publisher and multi-
subscriber crowdsourcing and identified sybil attacks
launched by greedy subscribers. To address the privacy
leaks and defend against the sybil attacks, we designed the
SybMatch scheme which can realize the privacy-preserving
task matching while supporting the efficient sybil detection.
We also comprehensively analyzed the security and perfor-
mance of SybMatch. Through detailed theoretical analysis
and simulation study in comparison with related works, we
validated that the SybMatch scheme is efficient and feasible.
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